Red State, Blue State

Demographic Change and Presidential Politics in Virginia

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Executive Summary

Virginia is one of the most closely watched battleground states in the upcoming presidential election, with the commonwealth’s 13 electoral votes figuring prominently in the strategies of both the Republicans and Democrats. Until Barack Obama’s upset victory in Virginia four years ago, the commonwealth had not voted for a Democratic presidential candidate since 1964. Some political analysts believe demographic trends have finally, and perhaps permanently, tilted Virginia from a “red” state to a “blue” state.

Such prognostications may be overblown. Demography is not political destiny; it only helps to establish the field on which the major contenders must play. The economy, current events, and the candidates themselves have at least an equal role. At the same time, demography suggests coalitions that might be formed, viable persuasive appeals candidates might make, and the most effective tactics campaigns might employ. Throughout history, successful political leaders have recognized and capitalized on demographic change to win victories for their parties.

This report briefly reviews Virginia’s political history, analyzes trends within key demographic groups over the past twenty years, and simulates the 2012 presidential election based on patterns seen in the last two presidential contests. Among the major findings:

- While Virginia’s minority population has grown significantly, this has not yet led to corresponding increases in the minority proportion of eligible voters.
- Nevertheless, the white (non-Hispanic) share of the 2012 voting-eligible population is expected to drop by two percentage points from 2008.
- Northern Virginia’s electoral influence has been growing. The region accounted for just over a quarter of votes cast in the commonwealth in 2008, and may account for a third of all votes cast in 2012. Among Northern Virginians, support for Democrats has increased over the past two decades, with 61 percent voting for Obama in 2008.
- In the most optimistic scenario for Barack Obama (replicating 2008 levels of voter turnout and voter support), he could capture 54.9 percent of Virginia’s two-party vote this November (ignoring votes cast for third parties). For Mitt Romney, 2004 turnout and support levels would give him a win in Virginia with 53.8 percent of the two-party vote.
- The Romney campaign would do well to follow a strategy focused on persuasion – increasing his margins among whites and making at least some inroads among Virginia’s expanding populations, particularly racial and ethnic minorities. Obama will need to focus more on mobilization – making certain his core constituencies turn out to the polls, especially blacks, and those under the age of 30.
Introduction

Virginia’s 13 electoral votes helped propel Barack Obama to the White House in 2008. Virginia was one of nine states to switch from supporting a Republican to a Democratic presidential candidate that year, and is once again considered a battleground state in the 2012 presidential election. After ten consecutive elections as a Republican stronghold, were Virginia’s 2008 election results an aberration, or a herald of change? This report considers the demographic drivers of presidential electoral politics over time, examines the changes that accounted for the 2008 outcome in the commonwealth, and discusses what the same forces might portend for 2012.

Despite strategic rhetoric to the contrary, demographics do not determine political outcomes. Neither Obama nor Romney will win Virginia due to the number of blue-collar men or young Hispanics in the population. The demographic composition of the population does, however, establish the field on which the major contenders must play – along with economic conditions, current events, and the candidate’s past performance. The demographic context also suggests possible coalitions, shapes viable persuasive appeals, and influences campaign tactics, making it worthwhile to understand the current demographic environment, its evolution, and its impact on presidential politics to date.

Virginia’s Modern Political History

Virginia has a long history of political conservatism. Though party affiliations have changed as the Democratic and Republican parties have redefined themselves, Virginia’s electorate has generally favored conservative politicians who value limited government and fiscal restraint. The decades-long dominance of Harry Byrd’s political machine during the first half of the twentieth century established a modern conservative foundation that influenced politics in the state long after his death in 1966.

Virginia’s political history has also been characterized by a countervailing trend: an expanding and diversifying electorate. As legal impediments to voter participation were lifted in the 1950s and 1960s, African Americans and previously disenfranchised whites swelled the ranks of the electorate. Since then, population growth has continued to increase the size of the electorate, while making it more racially, ethnically, and culturally diverse.

This history – defined by the collision between Virginia’s conservative tradition and the state’s diversifying electorate – is critical to understanding the still-changing electoral landscape of Virginia.

The Democratic Party
After Reconstruction

From Reconstruction to the middle of the twentieth century, Virginia’s politics were dominated by a very conservative and deeply entrenched Democratic Party. Many Southerners harbored continued animosity toward the party of Lincoln, and, throughout most of Virginia, it was rare to find self-avowed Republicans. Voting a Republican to national office was an exceptional event. In the 68 years from the end of Reconstruction to 1948:

- Virginia voted for a Republican presidential candidate only once;  
- Only one Republican served as a United States Senator from Virginia; and  
- Twenty-one of Virginia’s 104 congressional representatives were Republican; and only seven were able to hold office for more than one term.

This political dominance in Virginia was guarded by powerful Democratic Party leaders such as John Barbour Jr., Thomas Martin, and Harry Byrd, who maintained tight control of their respective political machines. A restricted electorate – enforced by complex registration requirements, literacy tests, and poll taxes – helped the party maintain power and quell opposition.
The “Byrd Organization” – in operation from the 1920s to the 1960s – wielded such thorough command that few factions or “anti-organization” elements developed outside of – or within – the Democratic Party.\(^5\) Getting the “nod” from Byrd was tantamount to securing the party’s nomination and winning the election. With an almost non-existent Republican Party, general election contests were mere “constitutional formalities.”\(^6\) The foregone general election outcome reduced the incentive for political participation in an already limited electorate. As a result, voter turnout and participation in politics by the general public was exceedingly low.\(^7\)

**The New Deal Coalition**

During the first half of the twentieth century, a confluence of demographic and political trends set the stage for dramatic change in the electoral landscape of Virginia and the nation:

- Millions of blacks fled the Jim Crow South, including Virginia, to northern cities during the “Great Migration.” In 1880 (immediately following Reconstruction), blacks accounted for 42 percent of Virginia’s population. By 1950, blacks accounted for just over 20 percent.\(^8\) With their newfound power to vote, black urbanites became an important constituency in the North.
- By the 1920s, a majority of Americans lived in cities, and political parties needed to win cities by comfortable margins in order to win entire states.\(^9\)

In an effort to remain a national party with national interests, the Democratic Party began appealing to a wider electorate than the solidly Democratic (and mostly rural) South. As the black vote in northern cities became more powerful, many northern Democrats lobbied to place the issues of race and civil rights at the forefront of their national platform. Franklin Roosevelt’s and the Democratic Party’s success as a political force during the Great Depression owed much to a newly formed coalition of blacks, laborers, and religious minorities in the populous cities.

Many Virginians were wary of this shift in the Democratic Party at the national level. Senator Harry Byrd, along with his southern compatriots, joined Republicans to defeat Roosevelt’s attempt to pack the Supreme Court with justices who were sympathetic to New Deal policies.\(^10\) This event gave rise to a coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans in Congress who would routinely challenge the liberal wings of the Democratic and Republican parties.

Wariness among Virginia Democrats turned to outright opposition with President Truman’s support for black civil rights during his first term as president. While Senator Byrd openly opposed President Truman’s Democratic nomination for president in 1948, Byrd and his fellow Southerners failed to derail the nomination. Several southern state delegations (not including Virginia) splintered from the Democratic Party and formed the States’ Rights Party, or “Dixiecrats,” under the leadership of South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond. Ironically, Thurmond’s place on the presidential ballot contributed to Truman’s surprise – but narrow – general election victory in Virginia and nationwide.\(^11\) Conservatives split their votes between Thurmond and Republican candidate Thomas Dewey, allowing for a Truman upset.

Truman’s win in Virginia would be the last presidential success for the Democratic Party for another 16 years. Troubled by changes in the party at the national level, Virginia Democrats started to cast their ballots for Republican presidential candidates. Eisenhower (1952, 1956) and Nixon (1960) both won solid majorities in the commonwealth.

**Johnson, Party Realignment, and A Rising Republican Party in Virginia**

Virginia’s electorate was also changing during this period. The Byrd Organization’s primary mechanism for maintaining power – restricting the size of the electorate – crumbled after court-mandated changes to Virginia’s discriminatory election laws during the late 1950s and early 60s.
As a result of these court actions, many African Americans, “anti-organization” sympathizers, and Republican supporters gained suffrage; and the two major political parties realigned their coalitions to keep pace with political developments.

President Johnson’s ardent support for civil rights was the major turning point in creating today’s major political parties. The Democratic Party became the party of racial progressivism, while Republicans sought their niche within the new political landscape. They found it in the fiscally conservative and small government positions of Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate for president during the 1964 election. Southern conservatives recognized the support for their racial views in Goldwater’s positions on limited federal interference in state matters on civil rights. Johnson handily won reelection, with Goldwater winning only six states, most of them in the formerly Democratic “Solid South.” Virginia, however, went for Johnson, marking the last time – until Obama’s victory in 2008 – that the Old Dominion voted for a Democrat for president.

The two political parties solidified their major coalitions after the Johnson-Goldwater election. Democrats represented the party of liberalism; Republicans were the conservatives. The South, including Virginia, was now Republican territory in national politics and several “safe” Republican congressional districts developed in Virginia. The tentative coalition formed by Goldwater in 1964 would later help propel Nixon, Reagan, and both Bushes to the presidency.

**Liberalization of the Old Dominion?**

Despite Virginia’s historical status as a conservative stronghold in national politics, the expansion and diversification of the electorate has slowly altered the political landscape of the commonwealth. Several demographic trends in the second half of the twentieth century are illustrative:

- Military and federal government expansion during and after World War II led to a transformation of Virginia’s economy. New federal agencies, military facilities, and related industry brought new jobs and new lifestyles.
• Economic development in the South (and the advent of air conditioning) led to a southern migration of Northerners (many with more racially progressive attitudes).¹⁴

• With mass in-migration and an expanding federal government presence, Virginia experienced a population boom in urban and suburban areas beginning in the 1940s. Northern Virginia experienced a 126% growth rate between 1940 and 1950 and continues to be the fastest growing region in Virginia.¹⁵

• For the past four decades, racial and ethnic diversity has increased in the commonwealth. In 1970, the population of Virginia was close to 80% non-Hispanic white. By 2010, it was 65% non-Hispanic white.

These transformations in Virginia’s population – and electorate – brought shifts in political attitude and dispositions as seen in the recent popularity of centrist Democratic Virginians (such as Mark Warner, Jim Webb, and Tim Kaine). Each of these Democrats won majorities in Virginia’s major metropolitan centers and owed much of their political fortunes to minorities and a rapidly growing liberal base in Northern Virginia.

Yet it remains to be seen whether Virginia will become a “blue state.” Republicans still hold significant political advantages in the commonwealth and will continue to benefit from Virginia’s strong conservative history. Over the past two decades, Republicans have maintained presidential victories in the midst of tremendous demographic and political change that, on its face, would have seemed to benefit Democrats.

Recent Demographic Trends and Projections

Long term demographic and social trends – at work since the middle of the twentieth century – continue to shape the commonwealth, as Virginia’s conservative tradition pushes up against a changing electorate. Analysis of data from the last five presidential elections – with particular attention to race, urbanization, age, and gender – provides further insight into more recent demographic changes and how they impacted the election in 2008. The following analysis also projects under what scenarios these demographic shifts might influence the 2012 election.

Several concepts are central to understanding how demographic trends may or may not influence the outcome of the presidential election in 2012. The “voting-eligible population” describes the pool of possible voters (U.S. citizens 18 years of age and older) while the “electorate” is the subset of this population that actually casts a ballot. Trends within the voting-eligible population and the electorate are more relevant to elections than changes in the total population. A more detailed explanation of these terms and data sources can be found in Appendix A.

The Growth of Minority Populations

Growing racial and ethnic diversity has been one of the biggest demographic shifts in Virginia over the past twenty years, especially in the commonwealth’s metropolitan centers. In 1992, racial and ethnic minorities represented 23 percent of the total population (the blue bars in Figure 2). In 2008, minorities represented 33 percent of the total population – a 10 point increase in population share in just 16 years.

Definitions

Voting-Eligible Population
All U.S. citizens age 18 and over

Electorate
All voting-eligible persons who cast a ballot

Voter Turnout
Percent of voting-eligible persons who vote

Candidate Support
Percent of voters who vote for a given candidate
This increasing diversity is much less pronounced among the voting-eligible population (the red bars in Figure 2). Much of the growth in the minority population in Virginia is occurring among Hispanics and Asians. These minority groups include sizeable populations not eligible to vote due to age (younger than 18) or citizenship status. As a result, minority growth as a share of the voting-eligible population is less dramatic. The 10 percent increase in minority share of Virginia’s total population between 1992 and 2008 translates to only a 5 point increase in minorities eligible to vote.

Despite a tendency toward lower turnout, the growing minority share of both eligible voters and of the electorate could be determinative. If 2012 minority turnout mirrors 2008 patterns, minority voters will comprise nearly 27 percent of Virginia’s voters. Even if turnout rates reflect the much lower 2004 patterns, minorities would still make up almost 25 percent of Virginia voters – a notably higher percentage than in 2004 or any prior election. Increasing diversity in the commonwealth, by itself, has significant political implications.

Exit polls from Virginia have consistently shown strong support for Democratic presidential candidates among minority groups as a whole, and this support has grown in the most recent elections. In 2008, 83 percent of minority voters in Virginia cast their ballots for Obama, up 9 points from 1992. This, however, masks significant variation among minorities:

- Black voters have consistently voted for Democratic presidential candidates with vote margins nearing 75 percent. This peaked in 2008;
Felony Disenfranchisement in Virginia

Along with citizenship status and age, voting eligibility is further limited by state law.¹⁷ For instance, Virginia places some of the most severe restrictions in the nation on the voting rights of persons convicted of a felony.¹⁸ Not only are current inmates, parolees, and probationers denied the vote, but ex-felons, who have completed their sentences and have been removed from supervision, are also disenfranchised in Virginia.¹⁹ Black men are six times more likely to be incarcerated than are whites, and Hispanic men are three times more likely to be incarcerated.²⁰ As a consequence, felon disenfranchisement affects minority populations disproportionately, particularly men.²¹

Scholars have estimated that one in five, or 243,000, voting-age blacks in Virginia are currently disenfranchised due to criminal records. More than three-quarters of these individuals have completed their sentences.²² Though ex-felons can have their voting rights restored, the process is more difficult in Virginia than in most states. Absent gubernatorial action, Virginia imposes a lifetime prohibition on voting for those convicted of a felony.²³ About 2 percent of disenfranchised ex-felons regained the right to vote due to gubernatorial restorations in the last decade.²⁴

- The Democratic vote margin among Hispanic voters in Virginia was only 4 percent in 2004, but jumped to 31 percent in 2008; and
- Virginia’s Asian voters favored Republicans in 2000, but have given Democrats a strong margin since.

At the same time that minorities have made up an increasing share of eligible voters, and an increasing share of the electorate, their votes have become even more decisively Democratic.

Lower turnout rates have typically limited the electoral power of these Democratically-leaning demographic groups relative to what it could be. In 2008, minority voters turned out to vote in large numbers, making up a share of the electorate on par with their presence in the voting-eligible population. The turnout rate among blacks, for instance, nearly matched the turnout rate among whites, an unprecedented event in the commonwealth. It was only 50 years ago when court-mandated changes to Virginia’s discriminatory election laws gave blacks full access to the polls in Virginia, and their participation in the 2008 election was a deciding factor in propelling the first African American to the presidency.

If minorities turn out this November at the same rate they did four years ago, the 2012 election could be every bit as pivotal in U.S. political history as the 1964 election between Johnson and Goldwater. The growing presence of minority voters in Virginia has shaped political strategy and discourse within both parties, and minority political influence will continue to be a factor in elections to come.

Urbanization

Since World War II, Virginia (and the rest of the South) has become increasingly urbanized as people left agricultural and rural lifestyles and moved into towns and cities. By the 1960s, a majority of Virginians lived in urban areas,²⁵ though urban growth in the South lagged far behind that of the North. It was not until the 1990s that northern and southern states could both claim that fewer than 2 percent of their populations lived on farms.²⁶

In Virginia, the major metropolitan areas of Richmond and Virginia Beach have grown considerably, but growth in Northern Virginia and the Washington D.C. suburbs has been the most remarkable. In the past two decades, Northern Virginia has grown by 52 percent. Between 1990 and 2010, Loudoun County almost quadrupled its population. This growth fuels political power for the region. In 2008, the nine counties and independent cities of Northern Virginia accounted for 28 percent of all presidential
ballots cast in the commonwealth (Figure 3).\textsuperscript{28} In the 2012 projections, Northern Virginians could make up as much as 33 percent of Virginia voters. Residents of the Virginia Beach and Richmond metros\textsuperscript{29} made up 17 and 11 percent of Virginia’s voters in 2008, respectively – numbers that have remained static over the last two decades.

Urbanization has tended to have a liberalizing effect on Virginia politics. For instance, city dwellers’ demands for more public services (such as new roads or public transportation) have been constant since the 1960s. Urban Virginians, as a result, began to identify increasingly with the political party that prioritized the provision of these services.\textsuperscript{30}

Northern Virginia has consistently favored Democratic presidential candidates since 1992. While the Democratic margin in Northern Virginia was very small in the 1990s (between a 1 and 2 percent advantage), it jumped to 8 percent in 2004, and skyrocketed to a 23 percent advantage in 2008, when 61 percent of votes cast in the region were for Obama compared to only 38 percent for McCain (Figure 3).

While voters in the Richmond and Virginia Beach regions also favored Obama in 2008, the Virginia Beach area has supported both Democrats and Republicans in the last five elections; and Richmond area voters have traditionally supported Republicans by comfortable margins, especially in the surrounding suburbs in Henrico and Chesterfield counties.

**Growing Differences across Generations**

Virginia’s voting-eligible population is simultaneously getting younger and older, with middle-aged citizens losing share. On one end, the so-called Silent and Baby Boom generations (born 1925-1942, and 1946-1964, respectively) are in or near retirement and include veterans from at least three wars. On the other end, the Millennials (born 1982-2003) represent a large and racially diverse generation likely to be as strong a political force as Generation X (born 1961 – 1981) was in the 1992 election of Bill Clinton.
The Young and the Old

18-to-29-Year-Old Population and Electorate Share

- Voting Eligible Population
- Electorate

Age 60 Plus Population and Electorate Share

- Voting Eligible Population
- Electorate

Source: Current Population Survey and Author Projections
In national surveys, the ideological differences between younger and older generations are notable. For instance, in general, Millennials are more tolerant when it comes to sexual orientation and race, and have more confidence in the government’s ability to solve serious problems. By contrast, older voters may have less faith in government. These trends across the generations are having a significant impact on the political landscape of the country, and Virginia is no exception.

Polling indicates a sharp divide between younger and older voters when it comes to vote choice as well, though the divergence in Virginia is relatively recent. Before 2004, younger voters favored the Republican candidate, or were evenly divided. By 2008, the young voted for Obama by a 21 point margin in Virginia. Voters above retirement age, too, were more evenly divided prior to 2004, but have favored Republicans in the last two elections by more modest margins (see Table 2, p. 14).

Middle-aged Baby Boomers have wavered in their political preferences in the past and gave Obama a slight edge in Virginia in 2008. In the years since, analysts have noticed a conservative turn among Baby Boomers at the national level. For instance, survey results show that a majority of Boomers now favor more conservative policy stances – including a smaller federal government that provides fewer services. Even modest Republican margins among older voters have electoral import. Due to high turnout, older voters are over-represented in the electorate compared to their numbers in the voting-eligible population (Figure 4). This is unlikely to change in 2012. Under both turnout scenarios, eligible voters over 60 make up well over a quarter of the electorate.

The young are less reliable participants. Among the 18-to-29 voting-eligible population in Virginia, only 42 percent voted in 2004, compared to 70 percent of the 60-and-over voting-eligible population. Even in 2008, a year marked by record high turnout among young people, only 59 percent of eligible 18-to-29-year-olds voted in Virginia, while 76 percent of older voters turned out.

Given their increase in the voting-eligible population, however, the young could represent a similar proportion of the electorate as in 2008, even under the lower turnout conditions of 2004 (see Figure 4). If, in 2012, young voters match their record 2008 turnout, they could begin to rival the electoral power of the older generations.

Gender and Marriage Gaps

Women are over-represented in the electorate compared to men. In Virginia’s recent presidential elections, women have turned out at rates between 2 and 5 percentage points higher than men. This fact acquires greater political relevance given the sizable “gender gap” in voting. Nationally, since 1980, election surveys have shown that the percent of women voting Democratic is between seven and 13 percent higher than among men. The gender gap has been shown to increase as the number of economically vulnerable, single female-headed households increases. The gap can also be partly explained by a sharp increase in conservatism among men on social issues, particularly in the last three decades.

In Virginia, the gender gap is evident in presidential elections since 1996 (Table 1), and has been characterized by a clear preference for Republicans among men and a more modest preference for Democrats among women.

Marital status, however, makes a difference. The voting patterns between married men and women are more similar than between married and single women. While single men are less likely than married men to vote Republican, single women show the strongest consistent preference for Democratic candidates (Table 1, lower panel).

Nationally, the “marriage gap” is evident among both men and women, but the gap among women is more pronounced and has been growing in every election since 1992. A combination of greater social independence from men and in-
creased economic vulnerability among single women partly contribute to the gap. Virginia exit polls only include information about marital status in 1992 and 2000, but these years mirror the national pattern. A minimal difference in Virginia (1 percent) between single and married women in 1992 grew to a 13 point difference by 2000.

Turnout rates in Virginia between single and married women are markedly different as well. Married women have relatively high turnout rates. In 2008, married women had a turnout rate of 75 percent, while the rate among single women was 67 percent. Turnout among single women has been low compared to their numbers in the voting-eligible population, and far less stable than for married women. The 2008 turnout rates, though, represent a high point for both groups.

In 2012, single women are projected to continue to comprise about one quarter of the voting-eligible population. If single women turn out in 2012 as they did in 2008, their share of the voters will increase by nearly 2 percent.

Demographic Summary

In regards to political consequences, the most noteworthy demographic trends of the last twenty years have been:

- Growing racial and ethnic diversity, with minorities increasingly voting for Democratic candidates;
- The growth of Virginia’s urban areas, where Democratic support has increased in the last two decades;
- A growing white elderly population that favors Republicans, in sharp contrast to their younger, and more diverse, counterparts; and
- An increasing gap in the political preferences between married and single women combined with a slowly growing population of unmarried Virginians.

Other factors contribute in important ways to the political landscape of Virginia. For instance, as Virginia’s economy has shifted in the last two decades, the share of eligible voters from blue-collar occupations (who tend to vote Republican) has been declining, while the share of eligible voters from the professional classes (with higher educational attainment) has been rising.

Also, the influence of income on vote choice has grown in Virginia. In 1992, 46 percent of those in the bottom third of the income distribution in Virginia voted for Bill Clinton, the Democrat, compared to 41 percent voting for George H.W. Bush, the Republican—a 5 point Democratic margin. By 2008, those in the bottom third of incomes voted for Obama, the Democrat, by a much wider margin of 25 points (62 to 37 percent). This is, in part, due to an increase in the percent of minority voters that make up the lower third of the income distribution; it is equally a re-

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| Marriage Gap in Voting in Nation |

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<th>Percent Voting Republican</th>
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Source: Virginia and National Election Day Exit Polling
The result of a declining Republican vote margin among lower-income whites.\textsuperscript{38}

The margins have remained relatively stable among those in the top third of the income distribution. In 1992, the vote among higher-earning Virginians was 47 percent for Bush and 40 percent for Clinton – a 7 point Republican margin. In 2008, those in the top third of income still favored the Republican candidate, McCain, by a margin of 6 percent (52 to 46). In short, the political preferences of lower-income groups have grown more Democratic while those of higher-income groups have remained the same.

The political coalitions cultivated by Virginia Republicans have been the most consistent parts of the electorate. White men, married women, and the elderly turn out to the polls at rates well above other groups and are voting Republican. These demographic groups can be relied on to show up at the polls this November.

However, long-term trends in the pool of possible voters work against Republican prospects. Growth in minority populations and urbanization favors Democrats. Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians are voting Democratic in larger numbers. So, too, are the young, single women, and Northern Virginia residents. Still, the groups that support Democrats generally show up at the polls at lower rates than their numbers in the voting-eligible population, so these trends have not always translated into electoral outcomes.

**Prospects for 2012**

While a close examination of the trends among demographic groups is informative, it is also worth analyzing how the population as whole might behave this November. To this end, the following section outlines a simulation of the 2012 presidential election across all demographic groups.

**Election Scenarios**

The 2012 presidential election, like all elections, will be decided by a combination of persuasion to strengthen support for the candidate, and mobilization (e.g., registration drives, get-out-the-vote campaigns) to increase voter turnout. It would be a mistake to assume that turnout and support levels among demographic groups will remain the same as in the most recent election. The pool of possible voters in 2012 might be less enthusiastic than the eligible voters in 2008 and not turn out. An unexpected event could intervene, as did the onset of the Wall Street meltdown in September 2008, propelling more people to the polls. Preferences might change in light of a number of factors such as a candidate’s past performance, or the choices available to voters on the ballot. Thus, when making a conjecture on the outcome in 2012, it is important to consider a range of turnout and support scenarios.

In this analysis, four scenarios are examined, combining voter turnout and candidate support levels across all subpopulations from the past two presidential elections:
2008 Presidential Election Results

If voters were mountains...

...then Northern Virginia would be Everest. The map below represents the number of voters in each county as an elevation. Overlaid are the individual precinct results as shown on the right. Both parties laid claim to several peaks, but the Democratic Fairfax County stands out.

Percent Democratic by Precinct

Max: 99.2%
Min: 13.0%

Official County Election Results

= Democratic Win
= Republican Win

Obama
1,959,532
52.6%
McCain
1,725,005
46.3%
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<td>Kerry (D)</td>
<td>McCain (R)</td>
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<td>55.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Women</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Women</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: The Current Population Survey and Virginia Election Day Exit Polling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2004, turnout and support patterns resulted in a sizable Republican victory in Virginia, with George W. Bush winning 54 percent of the votes cast (ignoring votes cast for third parties). In 2008, turnout and support levels resulted in a Democratic victory, with Obama capturing 53 percent of the votes cast for the two major party candidates. The divergence of these recent elections reflects a reasonable span of possible outcomes.

The four election scenarios were applied to a projected 2012 voting-eligible population. From this, four possible election results for Virginia were produced. The results reflect the percent of the two-party vote expected for Barack Obama and Mitt Romney. The possibility of a major third party contender was not considered in these scenarios. A more detailed overview of the methodology is located in Appendix B.

Projected Results

Across the four election scenarios, Obama wins a majority of Virginia voters in two, and Romney wins a majority of voters in two. The most optimistic scenario for Romney is the combination of 2004 turnout and 2004 support; under this scenario he wins 53.8 percent of the two-party vote in the projections. (In 2004, George W. Bush won with 54.1 percent of the two-party vote.) Demographic changes in Virginia’s voting-eligible population only reduce Republican support by 0.3 percentage points, primarily because the Democratically-leaning groups that have grown since 2004 exhibited especially low turnout in 2004. Romney wins a smaller 52.2 percent of the two-party vote if 2004 support is combined with the larger 2008 turnout.

The most optimistic outcome for Obama is a repeat of 2008 turnout and 2008 support; he wins a projected 54.9 percent of Virginia’s ballots cast for Republicans and Democrats. (In 2008, Obama won 53.2 percent of the two-party vote.) Demographic shifts account for almost a 2 percentage point gain in Obama’s projected margin. If turnout looks more like 2004 but Obama retains support among his 2008 constituency, he is projected to win 53.5 percent of the two-party vote – doing as well as he did in 2008.

These projections encompass a wide range of outcomes. The 2008 turnout scenario increases the Democratic vote by about 1.5 percentage points, compared to the 2004 turnout scenario, under either voter support condition. In a close election, this would be decisive. The 2008 support scenario increases the Democratic vote by about 7 percentage points relative to the 2004 support scenario, under either turnout condition. In other words, if Obama can maintain the levels of support among the key constituencies he won in 2008, turnout will matter much less in deciding the outcome.

This election, however, will likely be a closely fought contest with levels of support somewhere between the patterns seen in 2004 and 2008. As a consequence, demographic changes, even

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>2008*</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Racial / Other</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
<th>2008*</th>
<th>2012</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 29</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 44</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 59</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Plus</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender / Marital Status</th>
<th>2008*</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married Women</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Men</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Women</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Men</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2008 data are from the CPS November supplement
subtle ones, could prove to be significant. Changes in the voting-eligible population between 2008 and 2012, while modest, represent tens of thousands of possible voters.

Discussion

The demographic trends and simulations in this report not only highlight the broad contours within which the election will play out, but underscore strategic constraints for the campaigns of Obama and Romney.

All campaigns rely on some combination of mobilization (to increase the number of votes cast among supporters) and persuasion (to increase the number of votes cast for their candidate among the undecided and persuadable). Because Republican voters tend to be more likely to turn out to the polls, a winning strategy for Romney in the commonwealth must rely more heavily on persuasion than mobilization. Romney needs to gain large margins among his core constituency of whites, the elderly, and the affluent. A more difficult challenge for Romney will be improving his party’s margins among Virginia’s expanding populations — namely Hispanics; Asians; and young, white professionals in Northern Virginia. At a minimum, if Romney cannot win them over, he may emphasize the existing criticisms of Obama to give these Democratic-leaning groups fewer reasons to show up at the polls.

The issue of the economy will be a major tool for Romney in appealing to these groups. Public perceptions on the state of economy will be a key influence on voters in Virginia as it is throughout the nation. Of the three southern states that Obama won in 2008 (Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia), only Virginia has a relatively strong economy. Virginia’s most recent unemployment rate (5.6%) ranks as one of the lowest in the nation, while Florida (8.6%) and North Carolina (9.4%) rank as some of the highest. While Virginia’s actual economic situation looks good and may favor the incumbent this November, public perceptions of the state of the economy matter as well.

The national media will shape Virginians’ perceptions as much as local conditions. Thus, the Romney campaign has an opportunity to use the issue to his advantage in the commonwealth.

Despite Romney’s potential economic advantage, recent demographic changes suggest that he will be hard pressed to match Bush’s victory in 2004, even under the most beneficial voter turnout and support scenarios. The growth in minorities and young people in the voting-eligible population means that core Republican constituencies have lost some political clout.

Historically, the electoral participation of Democratic voters has been less reliable than that of Republican supporters. Consequently, Obama can neglect neither mobilization nor persuasion in his Virginia campaign strategy. Obama will likely win strong margins among blacks and those under
the age of 30, but these groups are more difficult to mobilize. “Get-out-the-vote” efforts and motivating the participation of these groups through campaign appeals will be crucial. Democratic support among Hispanics and Asians, however, has been more volatile. In addition to mobilizing these segments of the population, Obama must work to retain their votes.

Demographic changes between 2008 and 2012 have meant that Obama can afford to lose some support among white voters, the elderly, and the affluent, but only if he maintains turnout levels around those seen in 2008 among his core constituencies – no small task. Mobilization of his strongest supporters, the young and minorities, is not enough. Obama’s prospects will increase if he can minimize his losses among whites in Northern Virginia and retain some of the support among middle-aged voters he received in 2008.

In short, Virginia is not decidedly red or blue. The 2012 presidential election may reveal whether Virginia’s expanding and diversifying electorate has moved the commonwealth away from its conservative history. This report has shown that even the modest demographic changes in the last four years could have significant political consequences.
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Policy Associate, Demographics & Workforce Group

Dustin has worked extensively on research that lies at the intersection of demographics, politics, and public policy in Virginia, including redistricting, health reform, and social safety net programs.

Michele P. Claibourn
Research Associate, Demographics & Workforce Group

Michele has published research on presidential campaigns, political participation, and social capital and is the author of the book, *Presidential Campaigns and Presidential Accountability*. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Appendix A: Data Sources and Definitions

Data Sources

The data for the analysis in this report come from multiple sources. All sources, excluding the official election results, are sample-based surveys and, thus, estimates are subject to sampling error.

The November Current Population Survey

Estimates of the size and composition of the total population, the voting-eligible population, and the electorate come from the November Voting and Registration Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1992 to 2008.

The CPS, managed by the U.S. Census Bureau, is a monthly survey on labor force participation for the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States. This population excludes those living in institutional group quarters (such as prisons or nursing homes) and active armed service personnel. The November supplement of the CPS (conducted in each Presidential and Congressional election year since 1964) asks additional questions on voting behavior and registration, but does not ask about vote choice. The November CPS provides the best available sample of voters, containing a large enough sample of respondents in each state to make reasonable inferences about electoral eligibility and participation. The CPS weighting procedure corrects for bias resulting from under-coverage of residents by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin.

The electorate is composed of respondents answering “Yes” to the following question:

In any election, some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do not want to vote. Did [you/name] vote in the election held on Tuesday, [Date]?

Like all self-reports of voting, the CPS estimates suffer from over-reports of turnout, that is, more individuals say they have voted than have actually voted. The CPS estimate, however, is substantially closer to the true level of voting than are other widely respected surveys of voting behavior. For instance, turnout in Virginia in 2008, according to the CPS, was 68.7 percent (68.7 percent of eligible voters cast ballots). An alternative measure of turnout – one that divides the number of ballots recorded by the State Board of Elections by an estimate of the voting-eligible population in the state – estimates 2008 turnout in Virginia at 67 percent.

The March Current Population Survey

The estimates for the size and composition of the voting-eligible population in 2012 come from Weldon Cooper Center population projections. The data used for the projections come from the CPS March Annual Demographic File and Income Supplement; the largest and most used annual CPS supplement among demographic researchers. Data from 2006 to 2011 on racial, ethnic, and age composition were projected in order to arrive at a representative 2012 voting-eligible population, as elaborated in Appendix B.
Virginia Exit Polls


Because the November CPS does not include questions about vote choice, this analysis relies on the Election Day Exit polls – a survey of voters exiting the polling place – to gauge candidate support among the electorate and subgroups of the electorate. Exit polls, by definition, sample only voters, and are not contaminated by inflated self-reports of turnout.

Exit polls may suffer from selection bias, wherein certain kinds of voters are systematically more likely to respond. Research on exit polls suggest these polls overestimate Democratic candidates’ share of the vote more often than they overestimate Republicans’ share, and underestimate the Democratic vote share of Latinos and African Americans by over-representing higher income and higher education minority voters in the sampled precincts.

However, the exit polls are released with survey weights that account for differential response rates, mitigating against bias; and these weights are adjusted to be congruent with the final vote tallies. Using the weights, the differences between the exit poll vote margins and the outcomes are minimal. For example, the 2008 exit poll estimates Obama’s support at 52.4 percent compared to the 52.6 percent of the vote Obama actually won.

Virginia State Board of Elections

All data in this report pertaining to election results at the voting district, county, or state levels come from the official results as reported by the Virginia State Board of Elections.

Definitions

Voting-eligible population:

The voting-eligible population describes everyone who is eligible to vote, excluding non-citizens and those under the age of 18. The primary data source for this analysis is the CPS, and, as a result, all references to the voting-eligible population also refer to the non-institutionalized civilian population. CPS excludes armed service members and nursing home residents.

Electorate:

The population that casts a ballot in a given election is called the electorate. Eligible voters who did not cast a ballot are excluded. In this analysis, data on the electorate comes from the November supplement of the CPS. As a result, data on the electorate is from the non-institutionalized civilian population only. This definition of the electorate also includes those who submitted a blank ballot or those who voted for lower offices but did not vote for a presidential candidate during presidential election years.
Turnout:

All references to “turnout” refer to the rate of voting participation among eligible voters – the number of people who cast a ballot divided by the size of the voting-eligible population as described above.

Support:

Measures of “support” refer to the two-party voting preferences of the electorate for Democrats and Republicans – the number of votes cast for a given candidate (party) divided by the number of votes cast for either Democrats or Republicans.
Appendix B: Methodology

The methodology for predicting the 2012 presidential election outcome was based on the four scenarios using a combination of turnout and support patterns seen from the 2004 and 2008 elections. These turnout and support patterns were applied to a projected 2012 voting-eligible population using models that accounted for a wide range of demographic characteristics that were statistically significant predictors of turnout and vote choice.

The 2012 Voting-Eligible Population

Population totals for racial, ethnic, and age groups were linearly extrapolated from data in the 2006 to 2011 CPS March supplements in order to arrive at appropriate population totals for 2012 among these groups. These 2012 totals were then used to adjust the weighting of a two-year, 2010-2011 March CPS dataset to arrive at a representative 2012 voting-eligible population. The following turnout and support models were then applied to this dataset.

Turnout Models

Using the CPS November Supplement, an individual’s probability of voting was modeled as a function of many demographic and economic characteristics, including age, race and ethnicity, gender, marital status, education, income, and class of worker (defined by type of industry). Separate models were estimated for 2004 and 2008 to allow for the different nature of the electorate across these years.

The 2004 and 2008 turnout models were applied to the projected 2012 voting-eligible population producing a probability for each eligible voter for casting a ballot in 2012. Two projected 2012 electorates were selected on the basis of these probabilities, one based on the 2004 turnout assumptions and one based on the 2008 turnout assumptions.

Support Models

Using the Virginia Election Day Exit Polls, an individual’s probability of voting for the Democratic candidate versus the Republican candidate was modeled as a function of demographic and economic characteristics available in both the exit polls and CPS data, including age, race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, and residency in Northern Virginia. Separate models were estimated for 2004 and 2008 to allow for different levels of support for the two parties across these years.

The 2004 model and the 2008 model were applied to the two projected electorates (one produced by the 2004 turnout model and one produced by the 2008 turnout model), producing four outcome scenarios. A probability of voting for the Democratic candidate versus the Republican candidate was generated for each scenario – 2004 turnout and 2004 candidate support, 2004 turnout and 2008 candidate support, 2008 turnout and 2004 candidate support, 2008 turnout and 2008 candidate support. The predicted two-party outcomes for the 2012 election were based on these probabilities.
Notes


6 Atkinson, *Dynamic Dominion*, pp. 7-10.

7 For instance, a Democratic candidate for governor needed the support of as little as six to eleven percent of the adult population to be elected (Key, *Southern Politics*, p. 20).


11 Atkinson, *Dynamic Dominion*, p. 29.


13 Atkinson, *Dynamic Dominion*, pp. 33-34.

14 Congressional scholar Nelson Polsby suggests that air conditioning, more than other factors, was responsible for the mass migration of Northerners to the South after 1950. Many of these Northerners were “snow birds” residing in the South during winters and in the North during the rest of the year. With air conditioning, many of these Northerners decided to permanently reside in the South, or “sunbelt,” and they tended to bring their Republican sympathies with them. This helped create more racially progressive attitudes in Southern states. See Polsby, Nelson. 2003. *How Congress Evolves: Social Bases of Institutional Change*. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-108.


16 Analysis of Virginia exit polls indicates that the Democratic vote share among minority voters as 74 percent in 1992, 72 percent in 1996, 73 percent in 2000, 81 percent in 2004, and 83 percent in 2008.

17 Estimates in this report on voting-eligible populations, however, due not take these considerations into account due to data limitations.
Felonies include, but are not limited to, the manufacture, sale, distribution or possession of illegal drugs; property crimes like burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson; assault; disorderly conduct; and violent crimes like murder, rape and robbery.


Ninety-three percent of prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction are men. Among women, blacks are three times more likely to be imprisoned than whites, and Hispanics are about 1.5 times more likely to be imprisoned than whites.

In the majority of states, voting rights are restored automatically after the term of incarceration, parole, and probation are completed.

Since 2002, Virginia’s governors have streamlined the process of applying for restoration of voting rights in the commonwealth. Mark Warner restored the voting rights of 3,500 ex-felons; Tim Kaine restored the voting rights to over 4,300 individuals; and in his first year in office, Bob McDonnell has restored rights to 780 individuals. See Porter, Nicole D. October 2010. “Expanding the Vote: State Felony Disenfranchisement Reform, 1997-2010.” The Sentencing Project.


Northern Virginia is defined as encompassing the counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, Prince William, and Arlington including the independent cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, Fairfax, Manassas, and Manassas Park.

Virginia State Board of Elections, county-level election results.

The Virginia Beach region is defined here as the cities of Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport News, Norfolk, Portsmouth, Suffolk, and Virginia Beach. The Richmond metro includes the city of Richmond and Chesterfield and Henrico counties.

Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, p. 122.


Analysis of the National Election Studies, 1948-2008. From 1964 to 1976, the gender gap ranged between 1 and 6 percent. From 1948 to 1960, women were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate, with gaps ranging from 2 to 6 percent.
This is driven by two trends. First, because the minority population has grown, minorities constitute a bigger percent of the low-income group in 2008 than they did in 1992: 29% in 1992 versus 40% in 2008. Second, even among whites alone, the Republican vote margin among the bottom third of income-earners declined. In 1992, lower-income whites preferred Republicans by a 25 point margin; in 2008 the margin had declined to 15 percent. Among minorities, the Democratic margin remained stable.

Because the presence of third parties varies from election to election and can draw support asymmetrically from one candidate or another, it is difficult to incorporate this into projection scenarios.

For instance, most political analysts agree that Obama will have a difficult time winning the support of some of the white voters he won in 2008, and Romney will most likely not be able to win the support of minority voters to the extent that George W. Bush did in 2004. Most indications at the time of this report suggest a very close election, closer than either the 2008 or 2004 elections and perhaps as close as the 2000 election. See Abramowitz, Alan I. 2012. “Fasten Your Seat Belts: Polarization, Weak Economy Forecast Very Close Election.” Sabato’s Crystal Ball, July 12th.

Unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.


